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MICHAEL McKEON’S The Secret History of Domesticity is an
examination of the fundamental changes in European (but specifically
British) society during the early modern period, changes that culminated
in the emergence of the “modern.” McKeon’s focus is perhaps best
described as being on how epistemology — modes of knowing —
developed in this period, and that focus gives the book an incredibly
wide scope, from economics and political theory to pornography and the
origins of the novel.
The Secret History of Domesticity gets its title from a conjunction of two
aspects of the analysis McKeon presents. The secret history is a literary
genre whose history McKeon traces in the last third of the book. The
defining feature of the secret history is the intent to reveal the arcane
mysteries of the high by means of a story set in the low or domestic
realm. The secret history works on two registers simultaneously. On one
hand its shift from high to low lets the reader’s familiarity with the dom-
estic setting serve as a tool for comprehending the secrets of the
high. At the same time, the shift from high to low undermines the inherent
privilege and authority of the high by revealing its domestic roots, most
obviously and frequently by revealing its familial — read sexual —
underpinnings. Crucially, the secret history is also secret in a literal
sense, for its allegorical form both masks and reveals the truth it tells,
turning libel (or sedition) into satire or, more generally, turning the
actual or particular into abstraction or principle. Thus, to give examples
from the endpoints of the development of the secret history that
McKeon describes, Sir Philip Sidney’s Arcadia can be taken as the found-
ing example of a secret history in that its story of princely courtship set in a
foreign land — a story that revolves around issues of parental domination
— can be understood as a comment on the politics of Queen Elizabeth’s
court, and specifically her potential match with the Duke of Anjou. In
this instance, which is typical of earlier instances of the secret history,
the didactic purpose of the secret history is quite explicit in that the
high being unmasked is that of high politics, the workings of king and
court. By the time we get to Richardson’s Pamela, there is no intent to
reveal secrets of the Hanoverian court, nor, therefore, any particular
danger of a prosecution for seditious libel. There is, however, still a
devolution from high to low in that Pamela’s treatment at the hands of
Mr. B invites reflection on issues of tyranny and subjection and on the
status of woman as servant as compared to woman as wife.
The secret history is a prime example of what McKeon identifies in the
second third of the book as the process of domestication and its outcome,
domesticity. As suggested by the nature of the secret history, domestication
involves the way in which issues of more public import are examined,
explained, and indeed encompassed by the private. Thus Daniel Defoe’s
extended allegory figures credit — both public and private — as a
woman and provides advice to both monarch and merchant about how
to pursue and keep credit using metaphors that build on both gender
and courtship. Eliza Heywood’s Female Spectator links civic order to the
conjugal order, the latter being both emblematic of and necessary for
the former. The relationship between civic and conjugal that Heywood
depicts is, like all examples of the domestic, dialectical and self-referential,
for the principles and precepts she imparts through particular stories in
the domestic realm on one hand serve as points of origin for those narra-
tives and on the other are generated, with both their public and private
referents, from those narratives.
McKeon sees domestication as the formal method by which the
fundamental epistemological shift from the medieval to the modern
takes place, a “devolution of absolutism” discussed in the first third of
the book. Central to this devolution is a process of successive separations
by which distinctions that were implicit are made explicit. The chain, sche-
matic rather than chronological, runs thus: the royal government as emble-
matic of the organic whole of society separates into the state and civil
society; civil society then separates into politics and the household; the
household then separates into economic work outside the home and the
domestic sphere within it; which in turn separates into male and female
realms; and then to object and subject. The trajectory of the process of
domestication — the unfamiliar and unknown to the familiar and therefore
known — operates at each stage in this sequence. McKeon’s analysis
develops a series of related trajectories that capture different aspects of
this devolution: from public to private; from positive freedom (freedom
to) to negative freedom (freedom from); from personal to impersonal or
anonymous; from authority dependent upon status to authority dependent
upon empiricism and statistics (thus independent of status); from interest-
edness to disinterestedness; and, of course, from secret to disclosed.
McKeon shows, however, that working alongside this devolution are
processes that act to constitute the increasingly individuated, disinterested,
and private actors into a social whole, a public, which is self-constituted.
Any reading of McKeon’s argument, as with any summary, can only be
partial, for in one sense this book’s comprehensiveness defies categoriz-
ation. Moreover, the book’s scope means that any reading is inevitably
coloured by one’s academic training and historical inclinations (and limit-
ations), in my case the broadly defined field of social history. However,
with that caveat, I would argue that one way of reading McKeon’s work
is as an extended commentary on and extension of Ju¨rgen Habermas’s
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analysis of the bourgeois public sphere. The similarities are clear. What
Habermas describes as the bourgeois public sphere — an extension into
the public realm of the private sphere — fits in very neatly as one
element in the sequence of “devolutions” given above, and, like
Habermas, McKeon assigns crucial importance to the range of new
social forms such as sociability and print that emerged during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries and to the ways in which the public was
constituted. What McKeon adds to Habermas is an incredible depth of
analysis and example, showing how this fundamental process of explicating
the embedded was ramified across a series of social and intellectual fields.
More generally, McKeon’s explicit adoption of a dialectical analysis to
show how the embedded becomes explicit offers a more comprehensive
way of understanding the transformation from medieval to modern. To
take the example of patriarchal theory of government — one of the
initial features of the devolution of absolutism — McKeon’s dialectic
notes that the very act of explicating the implicit, whether it was James I
instructing Parliament not to “dispute what a king can do” or Filmer
theorizing the relationship of king as father to his people, creates the
platform from which John Pym or John Locke could challenge those
ideas. Embedded distinctions are known, but they are known as natural,
divinely created and therefore unquestioned. Once subject to analysis,
the separation becomes explicit and the authority (political, social, epis-
temological) moves down a step and stands revealed as a human creation,
therefore open to question and challenge. A crucial aspect of this obser-
vation is that the devolved authority then reconstitutes itself through a
process of — to put it crudely — averaging, which gives rise in different
epistemological fields to such things as public opinion, repeatable scientific
experiments, or a theory of aesthetics based on durability.
This approach, I think, provides some useful insight into some of the key
interpretive problems that confront historians of this period. One example,
drawn from the book, concerns the debate over the domestic ideology of
“separate spheres,” a two-part problem involving questions about both
continuity as opposed to change and ideal as opposed to real. McKeon’s
suggestion is that the division recognized by separate spheres ideology
was in many respects implicit in existing pre-modern social practices (con-
tinuity) but that, as such cultural conceptions became more explicit
(change), the process at once affected and was affected by social practice.
McKeon’s analysis goes beyond the soft option of solving thorny debates
by taking the middle road both because this explication is linked to a range
of other social and cultural developments, from political theory to the
ethical superiority of women over men, and because it shows how an ideol-
ogy of separate spheres became useful in the constitution of new forms of
social/political authority.
A second observation about the value of McKeon’s study follows from
the implications of this last point, for he is, refreshingly, interested in the
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big changes that took place in this period — not the least of which was the
development of commercial and ultimately industrial capitalism. This
focus is evident in his discussion of the emergence of the language of inter-
ests, particularly in the Restoration period. Interests, McKeon argues,
are rooted in the economic realm (the private) but have implications in
the public arena and are particularly crucial to the way in which the
King’s authority came to be questioned. As always, McKeon’s analysis
hinges on the complex and self-referential implications of the ways in
which these developments occurred. Thus, the King’s assignment of auth-
ority over printing to the Stationers’ Company subjected a public interest
— controlling what was printed — to the private interest of the Stationers’
profit margins. At the same time, even though the King no longer
controlled printing, an author like Defoe could rail against the absolutist
authority implicit in the Stationers’ privilege as being against the public
interest of a free press.
It is, however, precisely in its attempt to grapple with fundamental
processes of social change that McKeon’s analysis raises questions that,
in the broadest possible sense, stem from the inherent difficulty of connect-
ing an analysis of written (and mostly published) texts to the history of the
society as a whole. One such question concerns intent and causation, and it
has two guises. At the micro level, it concerns the relationship between
author and milieu. To give but one example, a very compelling discussion
of Eliza Heywood’s Female Spectator notes how the fictional “editorial
board” under which Heywood cloaked her authorial identity had a dual
function of claiming the authority of group over individual, but simul-
taneously softening and domesticating that authority by virtue of the
fact that the group met in her kitchen. Neat trick on her part, or was it
simply unconscious? McKeon is not clear whether we should see
Heywood as an agent driving forward the processes of domestication
and devolution or whether she was merely picking up currents in the
culture around her. I suppose the latter, but pondering the origins and
course of such currents leads directly to the macro-level question of causa-
tion. In the first chapter, McKeon gives a convincing analysis of how the
very act of warning Parliament not to enquire into the limits of his
power invited James I’s contemporaries to do just that. But why does
James warn in the first place? The search for first movers is, of course,
something of a chimera, but this question is an example of McKeon’s
tendency to focus on process rather than cause. This focus is particularly
clear in the first part of the book, which specifically denies that there is
any chronology to the cascade of devolutions from king to civil society,
to politics, to economics, and so on, and thus denies the possibility of
any contingent relationships between these developments.
A second question concerns the limits or endpoints of McKeon’s analy-
sis or, to put it another way, the relationship between the epistemological
developments he describes and social, political, and economic change in
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Britain during this period. In the first few terms in the devolution of
absolutism there is a clear correspondence between epistemology and,
for want of a better word, reality — the King did have less power,
public opinion became more important, household economies changed.
However, that correspondence does not persist. Most obviously, women
did not come to exercise political and social power in any meaningful
sense, despite the crucial role that femaleness came to play in political
and social rhetoric. Thus, part way down the chain, the devolution of
real authority stops and subsequent separations involve only virtual auth-
ority. There is also a social limit to this devolution of authority. Although,
in theory, everyone could claim the status of the autonomous individual
operating in the public, in fact, the practical exercise of power was
limited to those with means. McKeon’s analysis thus suggests ample
reasons why we might expect to find characters like John Wilkes expres-
sing popular discontent at not sharing in the political and social authority
that the epistemological developments of the age had promised; as we
know from his followers’ gleeful gibes at Bute’s domestic relations with
the King’s mother, they did so using the trope of the “secret history.”
However, Wilkes and the many radicals who followed him are entirely
absent from the book, for, as McKeon moves into the middle and later
eighteenth century, he becomes increasingly focused on the interiority of
experience, the domestic (the novel).
I raise both of these points not as criticisms but as indications of the
kinds of work that this book will engender. McKeon’s analysis of the fun-
damental epistemological changes of the early modern period has raised
some very important questions and offered a number of crucial insights,
but the final result is open-ended rather than definitive.
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